




The title of this volume, War, Technology, Anthropology, 
not only refers to war technology as an object of anthro-
pological research but also recognizes that anthropology 
itself can be a technology of war. Of the three forms in 
which anthropology contributes to warfare, the first and 
most direct form is collaborating with the army by provid-
ing ethnographic data on populations deemed insurgent 
(NCA 2009). A recent case in point is the militarization of 
AFRICOM, one of the US’s Unified Combatant Commands, 
which is present in African countries to pro-actively 
‘prevent war’, in part by predicting insurgency through 
cultural modeling (Albro 2010; Keenan 2008). A second, 
more insidious form of ‘war-technology anthropology’ is 
the diffusion of a militarized concept of culture (González 
2010) that justifies violent intervention by attributing 
‘tribal customs’ and ‘harmful cultural practices’ to certain 
populations, as opposed to the ‘democratic values’ of the 
occupying forces. The third and least acknowledged form 
in which anthropology supports the occupying forces is 
through silence on the matter of culture. Whether in dis-
course on human rights or debates on poverty and conflict, 
we notice a return to universalism. There is a tendency to 
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give in to globalist pressures and disregard the concept of 
radical difference. 
How can one explain the transition, beginning around 
1989, from covert CIA operations during the Cold War 
(e.g., sponsoring groups to overthrow democratic yet non-
allied governments) to the post–Cold War series of ‘just’ 
wars in Muslim countries that present no direct threat 
(Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya)? Some aspect of pres-
ent-day society assures the military-industrial complex of 
public approval. Historically, one could point to the way 
in which Christian fundamentalists, Orthodox Jews, and 
conservative Catholics have imposed their antagonistic 
definition of culture on American foreign policy since the 
1980s (Hunter 1992). But the approval has been more 
widespread. It went hand in hand with Western audiences 
increasingly identifying themselves with values such as 
gender equality and democracy, in the name of which war 
was waged, while anthropology—‘the’ understanding of 
humanity—increasingly avoided the culture concept. In a 
media-ruled world of pundits eager to intervene publicly, 
the anthropologists’ silence condones for the larger public 
the hierarchy of cultures that is used to justify military 
intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, and soon Africa. The 
condoning effect should not be underestimated when the 
silence comes from a socio-scientific discipline performing 
the state-salaried function of dissent in order to reassure 
the public that the state’s policies are being monitored.
The 300,000 soldier reports from the Iraq and Afghani-
stan wars published by WikiLeaks (2010a, 2010b) are 
instructive as to the problematic position of the coalition 
forces in relation to the local population. The picture 
emerging is that of an invader, alienated from the popula-
tion and mystified by foreign ‘human terrain’, that is, an 
occupier suffering from Western exceptionalism. If we 
check the WikiLeaks Web site for the 20 incidents rated as 
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most significant by visitors (as of 30 January 2011), the 
geographical locations of critical actions in these wars all 
appear to be roadsides, which suggests engagements in 
the least human of terrains from the disengaged position 
of armored vehicles. Moreover, in response to the growing 
critique about civilian casualties, the military has more 
recently undergone something of a cultural turn. In the 
WikiLeaks war logs, the references to culture dramatically 
increase in soldier reports after 2007; however, they are 
invariably of the stereotyping, dehumanizing kind: “It is 
in their culture to ….” 
In brief, the politico-economic structure of warfare has 
a cultural component. This small bundle of pithy essays 
offers an update on the cultural and structural components 
of war-technology anthropology.
Anthropology, Culture, and War
The fights in Iraq and Afghanistan together add up to over 
100,000 civilian casualties (Burnham et al. 2006), a num-
ber that continues to grow. The wars are the outcome of a 
decision-making process undertaken by US and European 
democracies. Between the decisions and the killings runs 
a long but unbroken line. This collection of essays retraces 
that line, which ranges from war technology, including the 
use of drones, night vision goggles, and war games, to the 
more oblique levels of warfare, such as hierarchical dis-
tinctions used in the media, the sensory language of the 
entertainment industry, the new magic resorted to by poor 
African miners, and ethnographies that objectify other 
cultures rather than having their perspectives rebound on 
the authors’ own culture. 
There are indications that recent social theories are no 
less collusive with imperialism than was functionalism in 
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the days of colonialism. For one thing, post-critical theo-
ries have emerged that no longer question the logic of the 
state apparatus. In Latour’s (2005) ‘actor-network-theory’, 
agency is dispersed in nature-culture hybrids. The maneu-
vers of the corporate elite are refracted by the network. 
There is no political structure supporting the chaotic and 
proliferating interactions of man and machine; the seem-
ingly decentered Internet exemplifies the network (see Joxe 
2002). In this view, cultures resemble the US Army’s Human 
Terrain Systems (HTS) Project,1 appearing to be interactive 
regimes devoid of perspective. Any claim to social critique 
is hopelessly ‘asymmetrical’. This post-critical position 
is understandable in terms of the dominant, constructiv-
ist approach of science and technology studies, in which 
networks of users and designers together decide on the 
norms to be implemented in technology (Feenberg 1999). 
The constructivist approach prides itself on squarely over-
coming the substantivism of twentieth-century dystopias, 
which warned about technological developments serving 
the status quo in function of a global political structure. 
This volume revisits the substantivist hypothesis on 
what was once called the ‘ghost in the machine’, namely, 
the tendency of technology to standardize behavior and 
sideline criticism and hence to sustain those in power. 
Realizing an era announced since the late nineteenth cen-
tury by various dystopias, the ‘ghost’ or the ‘magic’ (an 
invisible influence through this-worldly means) has, rather 
than replacing it, become an integral part of the machin-
ery called science and technology. The substantivist idea 
of such a lethal ‘structure’ refers to the current transition 
of nation-states (non-collaborative empires regulating the 
lives of their citizens) into oligarchic ‘corporate states’ (ver-
satile networks privatizing the commons), as described by 
Kapferer (2005: 16). Social negotiation is handed over to 
technocrats and to autonomous, anonymous apparatuses. 
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The drones do the killing for us. We hear ourselves order-
ing more drones. 
The dominance of the symmetrical, post-critical posi-
tion today prevents social scientists from confronting 
the reasons for current extremisms, starting with why 
the Taliban ‘hates’ the West. The presumed motives of 
religious fanaticism are poverty and suffered injustices; 
however, these do not account for hate. What the insur-
gents hate is something that they deem too obvious to 
point out and that Euro-Americans have become blind to: 
a deeply rooted sense of cultural superiority, the result of 
a history of colonization, imperialism, and scientific posi-
tivism. The twin towers of the World Trade Center were 
no arbitrary target on 11 September 2001. Skyscrapers in 
the Middle East and Asia had taken up the gauntlet much 
earlier, in acknowledgment of the challenge by the West. 
I here contend that the pinnacle of the latter’s deeply set 
sense of superiority is present in the social theories domi-
nating anthropology. What are concepts such as ‘global 
scapes’, ‘plural modernities’, and ‘flat networks’, among 
others, trying to tell us? They find the sign of their supe-
riority not in empirical data but in their culture, in their 
approach, which proves to be more open, inclusive, and 
diverse than the cultures being studied. In these theories, 
certain matters—for example, whether behavioral regimes 
in the public sphere affecting Muslim women might be 
‘good’, as in protective against jealousy, depression, or 
divorce—have become irrelevant. The non-Western cul-
tures under study are no longer in the position to deter-
mine societal theories; they inspire only moral discourse. 
Tolerance and an emphasis on diversity characterize the 
‘correct’ approach. Acceptance of ‘other’ views confirms 
the anthropologist’s superiority. This is how anthropology 
could gradually evolve into a technology of war. The dis-
cipline whose task it was to translate other perspectives to 
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the point of unsettling its own perspective has settled for 
tolerance. Thus, it not only condones the dehumanizing 
of other cultures’ values and practices but also exemplifies 
the search for a culturally supreme position. 
Discourse on cultural diversity counters the imperialist 
enterprise yet seems in line with that search. What hap-
pened to cultural difference, which highlighted the blind 
spot in any culture? Today it has become almost dissident 
for anthropologists to take small communities seriously 
enough to treat their cultures as actual ontologies, generat-
ing a sense of purpose that academics could not fathom (see 
Viveiros de Castro 2004; Willerslev 2007). Once schools, 
universities, and the media stop evoking the post-colonial 
hypothesis of radical difference, governments have no 
qualms about the price to pay for ‘rescuing’ other cultures. 
Moreover, the justification follows a surprisingly magical, 
actually capitalist rationality—that of profit according to 
investment. Spending billions of dollars to legitimize the 
deaths of soldiers and civilians rests on a magical expec-
tation. The ultimate human sacrifice will yield ‘freedom’ 
or ‘democracy’—something Western, at least, that could 
restore the West’s hurt pride at a time of diminishing oil 
reserves, rising Asian powers, and eager upcoming popula-
tions, Muslims and others. The motive is as rational as it is 
magical because any sort of help—whether through military 
engagements or development projects—benefits the already-
haves, shifting attention from the negotiable basis of their 
wealth to other people’s efforts to achieve wealth too. 
The Essays in Two Parts
The first part of the volume opens with a perplexing 
observation. Combat in Iraq and Afghanistan is often noc-
turnal, sometimes urban, and mostly erratic in response to 
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insurgents’ attacks. However, the latest technologies per-
taining to allied warfare, such as remote-controlled drones 
(Sluka, this volume) and night vision devices (Robben, 
this volume), serve instead to reinforce the insecurity 
that they are meant to eradicate. Jeffrey Sluka details 
the increase in civilian casualties and the role therein of 
technologies that ‘virtualize’ human targets. The use of 
drones makes life and death decisions less personal, but 
50 civilians are killed per insurgent. If the consequences 
were not so tragic, one could see the irony of the ‘war on 
terror’ being designated ‘overseas contingent operations’ 
by the current US administration. Judging by the rate of 
human collateral damage, these overseas operations are 
indeed ‘contingent’, as in ‘subject to chance’. 
Drawing on Virilio (2002) and Vasquez (2009), among 
others, Antonius Robben notes in the second essay how 
warfare in Iraq has come full circle in terms of violence. 
The face-to-face combat of World War I was succeeded by 
the empty battlefield due to artillery in World War II. The 
Gulf War, by introducing stealth planes, continued the evo-
lution toward ‘transhuman’ combat and resulted in very 
few allied casualties, compared to the opposition. The war 
in Iraq featured a return to close-proximity killing, but with 
a twist: the face-to-face combat was mediated, and made 
possible, by images that dehumanize the victim. Robben 
(this volume) points to the sensorial, ‘scopic’ context of 
equipment that affects the soldier’s weighing of life-or-
death decisions: “Nuanced human and social characteris-
tics that are present in real-life holistic vision are deleted, 
producing a reconstructed human representation.” 
The third essay by González bridges the apparent gap 
between war technology in the strict sense of that term 
and the use of cultural data to identify human targets. 
The human and social characteristics that Robben refers 
to are effectively deleted by anthropologists, who strip 
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ethnographic data from their broader social meaning and 
reduce them to behavioral predictors. González analyzes 
the government-sponsored reductionism of the Pentagon, 
which has committed $19 million to funding a Human 
Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program that is 
geared toward forecasting human behavior by means of 
computational/analytical anthropological data. He describes 
how the US Army’s National Training Center has developed 
software known as Reactive Information Propagation Plan-
ning for Lifelike Exercises (RIPPLE). Largely the work of 
game developers and Hollywood directors, RIPPLE employs 
ethnographic data to realize the army’s deadly delusions.
The participation of anthropologists in the US Army’s 
HTS research not only raises ethical questions, as suggested 
earlier. It is indicative that such research, in practice, has 
little to do with anthropology after its post-colonial turn. 
Brian Ferguson demonstrates in the fourth essay that in 
order to have their research fit within the army’s for-
mat, the participating anthropologists have deserted the 
qualitative and interpretive methods developed by the 
discipline during the last several decades. Tellingly, the 
only way in which anthropology could be suitable for the 
military is by returning to legalistic approaches to culture 
(e.g., lists of customs and beliefs) that date from colonial 
times. Such a return coincides with the shift to pragmatic 
consultancy work, which has sidelined anthropology as 
an intellectual discipline. Ferguson concludes this first 
part of the volume with a straightforward appeal: the US 
Department of Defense (DOD) should get out of the social 
science grant business and stop covertly funding research. 
In addition, a professional organization, such as the 
American Anthropological Association, should have a per-
manent open forum as a means to detect such maneuvers. 
Passivity—anthropology’s current state of affairs—makes 
the discipline instrumental in perpetuating war. 
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The DOD’s involvement reveals how firmly anthropol-
ogy is implicated in the American imperial venture. Yet 
there is no reason to assume that the trend is limited to 
the US, since it is perfectly in line with the global shift 
toward a pragmatic anthropology that serves development 
and surveillance purposes. Soon after the social sciences 
threatened to rise to prominence in the post-colonial era, 
they turned more positivistic on their own. With the ide-
ology of flat networks and diversity, and with the failure 
of anthropology to evoke radical difference as a counter-
weight to positivist pragmatics and capitalist rationality, an 
important obstacle to imperialist adventures has fallen.
The second part of this volume further broadens the 
scope by discerning the less patent forms of war-technol-
ogy anthropology, that is, the concepts and interpretations 
of the human experience that sustain violence and thus 
not only perpetuate but also spread and globalize war. 
One factor is corporate states that market security; the 
war on terror perfectly suits their goals (Kapferer and Ber-
telsen 2009). Across the world, these states gain signifi-
cance by virtue of the insecurity they produce. Whitehead 
(2005: 13) refers to a “cultural loop,” a means whereby 
violence reinforces violence: “roadblocks, random iden-
tity checks, manuals for identifying the ‘enemy’, and 
other forms of ‘security’ screening actually induce further 
insecurity and so generalize state violence or the threat of 
it.” The insecurity generated by state terror in turn calls 
for violent state response. As Der Derian (2009) argues, 
the media and the entertainment industry, and hence the 
wider public, are part of the effort to ‘realize’ violence by 
‘virtualizing’ US politics and war. ‘Spectacide’, the killing 
of an image, occludes the killing. 
The next essay expands this argument to include the 
most rapidly growing business worldwide: gaming. Follow-
ing the assessments in this volume by González, Robben, 
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and Sluka on the way that sensorial mediation plays a 
key role in today’s warfare, extending the battlefield far 
beyond its geographic contours through drones, radar, sat-
ellite images, the Internet, and scientific representations, 
Robertson Allen (this volume) observes that while the 
“ritualistic element of gameplay is therapeutic, imparting 
a sense of agency and control” over an unruly environ-
ment, the digital and audio-visual media in games can 
also resocialize military means of terror. 
In the following essay, a study of controversial war 
music videos, which Jean Baudrillard named ‘war porn’, 
Matthew Sumera (this volume) argues that people’s claims 
about the truth of video representations of combat can be 
understood only within the affective frame and impact of 
the soundtrack. The heavy metal music accompanying foot-
age from the US’s two battlefields soft-pedals the explicit 
violence. Similar to the foot soldier’s side drum of old, the 
soundtrack’s drumbeats and guitar salvos are inextricably 
part of “the aesthetics of contemporary warscapes.” 
As Sverker Finnström demonstrates in the next essay, 
the global war’s dichotomy of government versus insur-
gent has become the prism through which the national and 
international media report about political violence world-
wide, lending dictatorial regimes a veneer of legitimacy in 
their fight against revolutionary movements. The growing 
complexity qua local-global entanglements paradoxically 
gives way to ever simpler representations in the media and 
politics, keeping the dichotomy firmly in place in Uganda. 
Just as terror inscribed in the landscape perpetuates inse-
curity and war (Sanford 2003), a resource for state terror 
is cultural ‘othering’ (Spivak 1988), which stereotypes 
the ‘wild’ and the ‘uncivilized’. Finnström (2008) thus 
recounts the problematic relation between the Ugandan 
government, internationally acclaimed for its stability and 
AIDS policy, and its Acholi citizens, nationally reputed 
11Introduction: War-Technology Anthropology
as war-prone. Through such divisions, the Ugandan state 
maintains ‘a state of exception’ (Agamben 2005). The 
concept of ‘terrorist’ similarly serves the new right wing in 
the US by dehumanizing hostile regimes while continuing 
to sponsor state terrorism in countries neighboring those 
regimes (Sluka, Chomsky, and Price 2002: 22). 
What is the point of supporting peacemaking tools in 
Africa, such as democracy and schooling, if such peace 
preserves the democratic deficit at the global level? The 
essay by Koen Stroeken (this volume) describes the “car-
rion system” of Tanzanian miners, self-declared ‘vultures’, 
and their war-technology anthropology—more exactly, 
how their magic (called mwanga) accords with the global 
economy. The magic takes the form of an anthropology—
a definition of the human—that can be used for warfare 
because it operates on the economic premise that an 
extreme investment such as human sacrifice (e.g., children 
suffering from albinism) will yield an extreme outcome. 
The wider context of this magic is a perpetual (versus sub-
siding) state of violence, also called a ‘resident violence’. 
The global and perpetual war that the sacrificers of 
humans participate in permeates the concluding piece by 
Neil Whitehead and Nasser Abufarha. In it, they discuss 
the cultural dimensions that are crucial for understanding 
how acts of ‘suicide terrorism’ gain popular support and 
can potentially motivate individuals. The authors trace 
the transformation of the figure of the fida’i, the sacrificer 
(of self), during the PLO resistance in cross-border opera-
tions of the 1960s and 1970s. The self-sacrificer has now 
become an istishhadi (matryrous one), less secular, more 
Islamic. As Whitehead and Abufarha (this volume) put 
it: “In the poetics of Palestinian resistance, the sacrificed 
Palestinian body parts are a mimesis of flowing streams, 
nurturing fields, and blooming flowers.” The acts of mar-
tyrdom “‘penetrate’ the Israeli segregation wall, ‘break’ all 
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the barriers, and ‘pass’ all checkpoints” (ibid.). Violence 
has always been a domain of life, determined both cultur-
ally and socio-economically (Ferguson 1995: 278; Robben 
and Nordstrom 1996). Since 1989, we have witnessed 
the gradual, barely noticeable transition from regional 
conflicts to global warfare, structured both economically 
and politically.
Killing for Magic: The Global Political Economy 
Whereas some of the underlying causes of global insecurity 
have decreased over the last couple of centuries, the degree 
of terror and the rate of civilian deaths have increased 
dramatically in the most recent phase of warfare. Civi-
lized technologies of combat allow war to persist without 
appearing to escalate it. Night vision goggles and drones 
may limit casualties on the side of the allies, but they are 
not particularly effective in terms of ending global warfare. 
Previously, by making the most out of every kill, weaponry 
served to scare the enemy. The blood spilt visibly on the 
battlefield would push the enemy to surrender. Today, one 
side’s victory and the other’s capitulation seem secondary. 
Now, from the start of a war, the emphasis is on stealth, 
which allows one to kill as many as possible and get away 
with it. Again we notice the cultural factor. In a militarized 
concept of culture, it is inconceivable that the Taliban will 
ever change their minds. Because of their culture, they 
should all be eliminated, and this requires ‘clean’ kills, the 
kind featured in video games. The high number of casual-
ties during and after the 2003 Iraq invasion, estimated at a 
total of over 600,000 (Burnham et al. 2006), is concealed by 
the absence of blood on television and on satellite images. 
The main intention, it seems, is to prolong a military pres-
ence—that is, to perpetuate war for the sake of war.
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If warfare between nations is a thing of the past and is 
being replaced today by a global war, as argued by Hardt 
and Negri (2004), this volume shows that the ‘global’ 
actually refers to the way that war has become part of 
our economy, technology, thought, and entertainment. 
The technologies of precision bombing, satellite images, 
drones, and applied anthropology dehumanize the vic-
tims and, in so doing, guarantee the continuation of war. 
Nobody believes that the Af-Pak wars were intended as 
duels with winners and losers. The expected outcome is 
not surrender by the enemy in a conventional sense. We 
can imagine the incredulous reaction of a US general if 
a Taliban warrior were to approach him, brandishing a 
white flag. It is preposterous to suggest that a sudden 
show of respect for democracy and women’s rights would 
make a difference to anyone involved. Nobody counts on 
surrender. Nobody counts on the war ending. 
Why is this so? Together with the demise and subse-
quent militarization of the culture concept, we observe 
the mainstreaming of war. The military industry, like any 
other industry, counts on its profits rising annually. War 
technology no longer stands for an exceptional means 
purposely developed to assist in a specific war. Finding 
ongoing markets for warfare is a regular preoccupation of 
economic elites. A first piece of evidence is that the duel 
between rival states that are worthy opponents of each 
other—and would hence result in a potentially cataclysmic 
clash—is replaced by wars waged on countries that, in 
principle, stand no chance. Typically, these nations have 
a large population of poor people, who bear the brunt of 
the country’s loss of lives, and lack international commu-
nication channels that could present their side of the story 
(recently exemplified by army operations in Libya). An 
immediate predecessor was the Cold War, during which 
the two main rivals remained remotely affected while 
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the predatory implications of their economies (whether 
privately owned or state-owned) were exported to ‘civil 
wars’ in satellite states, mostly to global peripheries such 
as Korea, Vietnam, Congo, Togo, Angola, and Chile in 
what was then called the Third World. During the Reagan 
administration in the 1980s, at a time when no incidents 
of ‘terrorism’ were recorded and the Cold War appeared to 
wane, counter-terrorism was a promise made to the indus-
try in the form of a prophecy (Zulaika 2009). 
A second indicator of the war’s economic impetus is 
the US military’s change of the designation ‘global war 
on terror’ to ‘the long war’. As exemplified by the epithet 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, it seems that the only sure 
feature of the war is its perpetuity (Joxe 2002; Kapferer 
2005). David Keen (2007) has listed the advertising tricks—
or what he calls ‘magic’—that the US government has been 
using to keep the war serial and endless. These tactics 
include scapegoating, wishful thinking, creating a demand 
for one’s military supply, promising big gains, and lumping 
conflicts across the world into one enemy. The last tactic 
to perpetuate war has been alternated with its opposite, 
an equally effective disaggregation, as illustrated by the 
Obama administration’s recent preference for the innocu-
ous-sounding phrase ‘overseas contingent operations’.
A third indicator of the economic structure of warfare 
is manifest in the historical evolution since the 1814 Treaty 
of Ghent, which ended the war between Great Britain and 
the United States of America, wherein (besides promoting 
the abolition of slavery) the latter promised to restore to 
the “Tribes or Nations of Indians … all the possessions, 
rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or 
been entitled to in 1811 previous to such hostilities.”2 The 
Treaty of Ghent testified to an awareness about the sig-
nificance of war beyond its geographic confines, such as 
the injustice befalling satellite groups. Two centuries later, 
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poverty, as endured by the Indian Nations or the formerly 
colonized, has basically become an identity marking the 
enemy. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the warred-on side is 
not supposed to stand a chance. No possessions, rights, 
or privileges that they may have enjoyed or been entitled 
to previous to such hostilities will be restored. This fixed 
hegemonic structure within a bustling global network 
of criss-crossing cultural flows is what Hardt and Negri 
(2000, 2004) understand by ‘Empire’. Our remarkable 
disinterest in the casualties is proof of the extent to which 
Empire means war. Only people fully involved in a war do 
not care about casualties.
A final indicator of the economic impetus of war is that 
nobody seriously believes that victory by ‘our armies’ will 
achieve an end to the war, after which an era of peace 
will commence. There could be no world without one or 
the other state sooner or later provoking the anger of the 
(currently) sole superpower, followed by a call for preven-
tive strikes under the banner of security. A common trait 
of the political regimes targeted by the US since World 
War II is not dictatorship. Rather, what the USSR, the 
ayatollahs, and the Taliban have in common is the denial 
of the standards by which the US triumphs over the rest 
of the world. Many American citizens, if they were bet-
ter informed, would probably not sympathize with the 
corrupt elites put in place by their administration and 
perhaps could identify better with the rebels, who believe 
that they are fighting for a righteous cause and against a 
powerful oppressor. 
Why do we focus on the bearded ayatollahs, the Taliban, 
the Maoist Vietcong, and the freedom fighters recruited 
from villages, rather than targeting the opulent squander-
ing of the shah (Iran), the corruption of bureaucratic elites 
(South Vietnam), or the dictators (such as Mobutu in the 
former Zaire) who violate every human right? The evil of 
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dictators does not scare us because it keeps the structure 
of our global political economy in place. What scares us is 
the alternative. By representing the invasions as indepen-
dent from the history of ideas that disciplines partake of, 
anthropologists risk distancing these moments of violence, 
placing themselves in the position of spectators, and pre-
tending that these are not their battles. The war will last as 
long as one of the parties denies being involved.
Notes
 1. See http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/.
 2. Treaty of Ghent (1814), article 9, Library of Congress, http://
www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Ghent.html.
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